Privacy policy
What this site stores about the user, why it stores it, and what the user can do about it. It describes what the software actually does today, not what a template says it might do.
Last updated 30 Oct 2026
Who is responsible
The controller for the personal data described here is WAVETOL FUSION LIMITED, Coliemore House, Coliemore Road, Dalkey, Co. Dublin, Ireland. Data protection enquiries: privacy@pirepaero.com.
There is no appointed data protection officer; enquiries go to the address above.
What is stored, and why
- The user's email address
- Required in order to have an account. It is used to confirm the registration, recover the password and send the notifications the user chooses. The password is stored only as a hash (scrypt), never in clear text. If the user logs in with a Google or Facebook account instead, that service tells us the email address and an account identifier, and nothing else.
- The user's username and display name
- Shown publicly beside everything the user contributes. The user chooses a username when registering, and can change it — and the display name — on the account page. The username can only be changed once every 30 days, because it is a public URL and every change breaks the links to it. Neither has to be a real name.
- What the user contributes
- Facts, confirmations, corrections, comments, forum posts and photos, each with the user's username and a date. This is public by design — peer review does not work anonymously — and it stays visible as part of the record.
- The user's reputation score
- A number derived from the user's contributions and how they were received. It appears on the public profile and it decides what the user can publish without review.
- The audit log
- Every change writes one row: who did it, what changed, when, plus a hash of the IP address and of the browser user-agent behind the request. The IP itself is never stored. The hash is salted with a server secret and truncated, and exists to investigate abuse and reconstruct what happened — not to profile or locate the user.
- Rate limiting
- The user's IP address is used in memory to count requests over a short window. It is not written to the database.
- Photos the user uploads
- Stored with the user's account as the uploader. All embedded metadata — EXIF, IPTC, XMP, including GPS coordinates — is stripped during processing and never reaches storage.
- Experience reports about schools and airlines
- Deliberately pseudonymous. The user identifier is never written in clear; it is encrypted, alongside a one-way hash that lets the author find and delete their own reports. The next section explains it.
- Content reports
- When a user reports content, the report, that user's email address and the outcome are stored with a ticket reference, so the case can be followed and the decision appealed.
- Notifications
- Email addresses queued for outgoing notifications about the user's own content — a confirmation on a fact of theirs, a moderation decision. For someone who adds a visit to their map, this includes a single email the next day asking how it went — sent only if the user has not reported on that airfield in the meantime, and switched off in the preferences like any other.
- Private messages
- Nobody at PirepAero reads private messages. There is no admin screen that lists or searches them, and no query in the software that returns a conversation to anyone who is not in it. The only way a message reaches a moderator is if one of its participants reports it: at that moment the message and the ten before it are copied into the report, and moderation happens on that copy — there is no link back to the conversation. Messages are deleted with the account, the author can delete their own at any time, and everything older than 24 months is deleted automatically. Notification emails never quote what was written; they say only that someone sent a message.
- Saved airfields and the “Keep track” map
- The airfields the user saves and the visits they record — airfield, date, optional origin, whether they landed there as an alternate, a private note and, when a GPX or KML track log is imported, the simplified path of that leg — stay in the account and are visible only to them. An imported file is read to detect legs and landings and is not kept. Visits that come from the user’s own reports are computed from those reports, not copied. None of this is written to the audit log. If the user turns on map sharing, the public page shows only the airfields and the totals, never dates, notes, origins or paths; sharing is off by default. All of it is included in the export and deleted with the account.
- Country and flying profile
- At sign-up the user states their country and, if they wish, how and what they fly. The country decides which airfields appear first on the home page; the flying profile is used for aggregate statistics and small adjustments, such as showing heliports by default to helicopter pilots. They never appear on the public profile or next to the user’s name anywhere, are included in the export and are deleted with the account.
- Waiting list
- Anyone who joined the waiting list before launch gave an email address, confirmed by a link. It was used for a single launch email. Asking to leave deletes the row rather than anonymising it.
Pseudonymous experience reports
Reports about flight schools and airlines are the one place where authorship is hidden, because a named report about the author's own school is a report nobody writes.
The protection is technical, not a promise. The stored row holds an AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the user identifier plus a one-way HMAC of it. The key lives only in the server environment, and without it the site cannot even accept a submission — storing the identifier "temporarily in clear" is exactly the leak this design exists to prevent.
Revealing who wrote a report requires an administrator account, is refused to every other role including moderators and stewards, requires a written reason, and writes its own entry in the audit log. In practice that is for a legal order or a credible threat, not curiosity.
Cookies and local storage
- Session cookie
- Set when the user logs in, httpOnly, and the only thing that keeps the session alive. Sessions live server-side; the cookie holds a random token and nothing about the user.
- NEXT_LOCALE
- Remembers which of the three languages the user last used, so a link without a language prefix leads to the right one.
- Content report token
- Set only when the user opens a link to a content report they filed. It takes the secret out of the URL so it stops appearing in the browser history and in referrer headers. httpOnly.
- Theme preference
- Light or dark, kept in the browser's local storage. Not a cookie, and never sent to the server.
- Training progress
- Which briefings the user marked as studied, kept in the browser's local storage only. It never leaves the device and it is not tied to the account.
- Trusted device
- Only for moderators and administrators who choose “trust this device” when entering their two-factor code: a 30-day httpOnly cookie holding a random secret. The server keeps only a hash of that secret and a label such as “Chrome · macOS”. Devices can be revoked one by one on the account page.
- Saved airfields without an account
- When not signed in, saved airfields live only in the browser’s local storage; on signing in, that list is moved to the account once.
- “Plan a flight” checklist
- What the user ticks and writes in the pre-flight checklist stays only in the browser’s local storage. It never leaves the device and is not linked to the account.
There is no third-party analytics, no advertising, no tracking pixel and no third-party script that follows the user between sites. We count visits to the site in aggregate (per day, language and type of page), without cookies and without external services. To count distinct visitors per day we use a code derived from the IP address and the browser that cannot identify anyone, does not link one day to the next and is deleted after 2 days; visitors with “Do Not Track” or “Global Privacy Control” enabled are not counted. Nothing here asks for consent because nothing here is used for anything other than making the site work and knowing how many people use it.
Who else sees it
Hosting and database: Hetzner Online GmbH (Gunzenhausen, Germany), on servers in Helsinki, Finland — European Union, with data stored in the European Union.
Email delivery: Resend, Inc. (sending, from the European Union region) and Cloudflare, Inc. (routing of incoming mail), used for confirmation, password-recovery and notification emails. Mail the user sends us is forwarded by Cloudflare to a mailbox hosted by Google (Gmail), where it is read and answered.
Google, and only if the user chooses to log in with a Google account.
Meta (Facebook), and only if the user chooses to log in with a Facebook account. We ask only for the email address and the account’s public identifier; we store only the email and that identifier — never the name, picture or friends list, and no access tokens.
Background maps are loaded directly from the OpenStreetMap Foundation’s servers (tile.openstreetmap.org): when a map is opened, the user’s browser requests those images and their IP address is visible to that service, as with any image loaded from another site. We send it nothing else.
Nothing is sold, rented or shared for advertising, and nothing is transferred outside the European Economic Area other than through the providers named above and their own safeguards.
How long it is kept
Account data is kept for as long as the account exists.
Contributions are kept indefinitely as part of the aerodrome record. Nothing in the history is ever overwritten: a value is superseded, never replaced in place.
The audit log only ever grows: a database trigger means nothing in the application can edit or delete a row, administrators included. That is a deliberate integrity property, and it means audit entries outlive the account they refer to.
Content reports are kept with their decision for as long as the transparency record requires.
Operational logs are pruned on a schedule (`db:prune-logs`). The audit log is the exception that needs explaining: entries that record a moderation decision — content reports and their outcome, DSA notices and appeals, contribution and dispute decisions, role and account changes — are kept for 60 months, because they are the evidence behind a decision that can be challenged and the source of the transparency figures. Every other audit entry is pruned after 24 months.
Notification records are deleted 90 days after the email is sent. Expired sessions and expired login tokens are deleted as soon as they expire.
Private messages are deleted after 24 months, by a separate job.
The user's rights
Under the GDPR the user can ask for access to their data, correction, erasure, restriction of processing and portability, and can object to processing. The user can also complain to a supervisory authority — the one in the country where they live, or the Data Protection Commission (Ireland), which supervises the controller.
Most of it is self-service, on the account page: the user can export everything we hold about them as a JSON file (Articles 15 and 20), change their display name and username, delete their own experience reports from the page that lists them, and delete the account itself.
Deleting the account anonymises it rather than dropping the row. The email address, name, display name, username, picture, role and password are cleared, any stewardship ends, and the sessions and any linked Google or Facebook account are deleted outright — access stops the same second, not at the next login. A suspended account can still delete itself; the right to erasure is not a reward for good behaviour.
Erasure has a real limit, and it is better said plainly than buried. What goes is everything that identifies the user. What stays is what they contributed: other pilots' confirmations point at it, the verification state of a field is computed from it, and nothing in the history is ever overwritten, by design. Deletion cuts the link between the user and those contributions. It cannot undo the fact that they existed.
For anything the account page does not cover — a correction, a restriction, an objection — the address is privacy@pirepaero.com.
Age
Accounts are for people aged 13 and over. Anyone who believes a younger child has created one can write to privacy@pirepaero.com, and it will be removed.
Changes
If this policy changes in a way that matters, the date at the top changes with it and account holders are told by email.
Contact
Privacy questions and rights requests: privacy@pirepaero.com. Exporting data and deleting the account are both self-service, in the account settings. Operator details are on the "Who we are" page.